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Francisco de Vitoria on Prudence and the Nature of Practical Reasoning 
 
The history of the concept of prudence in moral philosophy is often portrayed as a 
history of loss. According to the classical version of this view, it is, more specifically, a 
loss in moral significance: On Aristotle's account, there is a constitutive link between 
prudence and morality. Prudence provides morality with a sense for the particularities 
and the contingency of the situations in which agent has to act. And morality, by way of 
a substantial conception of the good life for human beings, provides prudence with an 
ethical impregnation that sets it apart from mere cleverness or cunning.
1
 Aquinas and 
other medieval authors largely adopt this Aristotelian doctrine, though they relocate it in 
the wider framework of Christian moral theology.
2
 In the philosophy of modernity, 
however, the constitutive link between morality and prudence is cut off by authors like 
Machiavelli, Hobbes, and Kant. They take prudence to be the ability to identify the most 
effective means to goals set no longer by morality but by the agent's contingent desires. 
So for them, prudence is mere cleverness or cunning after all.
3
  
There is, however, an alternative to this classical version of the history of the concept of 
prudence. It is also essentially a history of loss, but it suggests that the history of the 
concept of prudence must be divided in a rather different manner: not between antiquity 
and the Middle Ages on the one hand and modernity on the other, but rather between 
antiquity on the one hand and the Middle Ages and modernity on the other; and not for 
moral, but for epistemological reasons.
4
 According to this view, the overly Aristotelian 
interpretation of Aquinas's moral philosophy implied in the classical version of the 
history of prudence has been justly criticized for overlooking an important difference 
between the moral theories of Aristotle and Aquinas: For Aristotle, there can be no such 
thing as a moral or practical science. Because of the essential contingency of the realm 
of human action, we cannot have moral knowledge in the strict sense of scientific 
knowledge (epistēmē), but only in a weaker sense similar to the practical knowledge of 
art (technē). By contrast, Aquinas and many other medieval authors, being fully aware 
of Aristotle's reservation, introduce the concept of a “practical science” (scientia 
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practica) into moral philosophy,
5
 which is based on the idea that there are necessary 
truths about human action after all – truths that can be known by us and that are the 
object of strictly scientific moral knowledge.
6
 It is then argued that this “scientification” 
of moral knowledge in the Middle Ages results in a gradual marginalization of 
prudence: In the 13
th
 and 14
th
 century, Aquinas and Jean Buridan aim at a conception of 
moral knowledge that integrates scientific and prudential elements, despite their 
awareness of the epistemological tensions between the concepts of science and 
prudence.
7
 In the 16
th
 century, the Salmantine theologian Francisco de Vitoria abandons 
this inclusive approach. He argues that prudence, being merely deliberative knowledge, 
must be excluded from moral knowledge understood as a strict science of human 
action.
8
 Eventually, in the 17
th
 century, John of St. Thomas draws “the final 
conclusions” from these considerations by defending the view that prudence, while 
being genuinely practical knowledge, is not part of moral philosophy; and that moral 
philosophy, though being scientific knowledge in the strict sense, is a purely theoretical 
science.
9
  
In this paper, I would like to pursue this alternative approach to the history of the 
concept of prudence a little bit further. I share the view that there is a crucial difference 
between Aristotle's and Aquinas's understanding of moral knowledge, and that this 
difference is best captured by pointing to the concept of a practical science. 
Furthermore, I share the view that it is precisely this project of a “scientification” of 
moral knowledge that calls into question the role of prudence in moral action. What I 
would like to propose, however, is a different account of Francisco de Vitoria's role in 
this development. I would like to show that Vitoria, instead of excluding prudence from 
moral philosophy, gives an integrated account of scientific moral knowledge and 
prudence that Aquinas lacks. It will turn out, however, that this integration comes at a 
price, for Vitoria cannot explain how prudence allows an agent to deal with the problem 
of contingency in action.  
In order to argue for these claims, I would first like to review briefly Aristotle's and 
Aquinas’s rival accounts of moral knowledge which can be interpreted as posing the 
problem Vitoria is faces with (1). Then I would like to show that Francisco de Vitoria 
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gives a more consequently integrated picture than Aquinas of the role of prudence in 
moral knowledge, a picture that largely depends on the idea that practical reasoning is 
essentially deductive (2). Finally, drawing on Donald Davidson's work on the nature of 
practical reasoning, I would like to argue that Vitoria's account is not convincing, for it 
eventually cannot explain how prudence allows an agent to deal with the problem of 
contingency in action (3).  
 
1. Aristotle and Aquinas on Prudence: Two Rival Accounts of Moral Knowledge 
 
Since Aristotle's and Aquinas's rival accounts of moral knowledge can be interpreted as 
posing the problem Francisco de Vitoria is addressing in his treatment of prudence, that 
is where I would like to begin. I aim to do three things in this section: First, I am going 
to have a brief look at Aristotle's definition of prudence in EN VI. Secondly, I will show 
how heavily Aquinas relies on EN VI in his treatment of prudence in STh II-II, q. 47. 
Finally, I will argue that this treatment of prudence is at odds with Aquinas's general 
conception of moral knowledge.  
 
(I) For Aristotle, as for Aquinas, prudence is one of the intellectual virtues. While all 
intellectual virtues are doxastic attitudes the object of which are true propositions,
10
 they 
differ from one another because they have different objects and different modes and 
degrees of justification. On the one hand, there are the intellectual virtues of science 
(epistēmē), wisdom (sophia), and intellect (nous). They belong to the scientific or 
theoretical side of reason, because they are all concerned with things that are necessary 
and not in our power to change. But they play different roles in that domain: We 
scientifically know only those necessary propositions that are the subject of 
demonstration.
11
 Intellect, on the other hand, is the doxastic attitude the object of which 
are the self-evident principles in which scientific demonstration finally terminates.
12
 
And wisdom is defined as the intellectual virtue that comprises science and intellect.
13
 
On the other hand, there are the intellectual virtues of art (technē) and prudence 
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(phronēsis). They belong to the deliberative or practical side of reason, because they are 
concerned with things that are contingent and in our power. But they also play different 
roles: Art is the doxastic attitude concerning production, while prudence is the doxastic 
attitude concerning human action in the narrow sense of praxis, i.e. moral action that 
constitutes a good life for human beings and is an end in itself.  
Given this scheme of intellectual virtues, Aristotle defines prudence as “a characteristic 
accompanied by reason, in possession of the truth, and bound up with action pertaining 
to the human goods”.14 He illustrates the point of this definition by comparing prudence 
with science and art: Prudence is not science, because science is a true doxastic attitude 
with respect to necessary propositions that are the subject of demonstration; but no 
demonstration is possible for propositions that concern the contingent realm of human 
action. But prudence also is not art, because it is a true doxastic attitude with respect 
moral action as opposed to production.15 This characterisation of prudence corresponds 
with Aristotle's claims that we ought not to expect more certainty from ethics than 
“accords with the subject matter”; and that, since human affairs “admit of much dispute 
and variability”, it will suffice to attain the truth about human action only “roughly and 
in outline” by stating how things are “for the most part”.16  
 
(II) In his treatment of prudence in STh II-II, q. 47, Aquinas relies heavily on EN VI. He 
is first concerned with the place of prudence in the human soul and argues that it 
belongs to practical reason, since the prudent agent is the one who can “deliberate well”, 
and deliberation is an activity of practical reason directed at intentional action.
17
 Also, 
he points out that since prudence is concerned with the application of cognition to 
action, the prudent agent must have knowledge not only of the universal principles of 
action but also of the contingent, singular circumstances of action, though these can be 
known only in the form of certain rough generalizations about “the things that happen in 
most cases” (quae ut in pluribus accidunt).18  
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Aquinas then explores the idea that prudence is an intellectual virtue by asking two 
question. Firstly, he asks whether or not it is a virtue at all, defining a virtue as a habit 
that perfects or “makes good” the character of a person and her consequent actions.19 He 
then argues that there is a weak and a strong sense in which a habit can be a virtue: 
Habits that are concerned with the goodness of a person's appetite and action are virtues 
in a strong sense, because they regard the good formally as such – i.e. as something to 
be strived for – and are therefore essentially related to good action. This is the case with 
the moral virtues which are perfections of the appetitive part of the soul. But habits that 
are concerned with true propositions and not with the goodness of appetite and action 
are virtues only in a weak sense, because they treat the good only materially – i.e. 
insofar as something true or false can be predicated of it
20
 – and are therefore not 
essentially related to good action. This is the case with most of the intellectual virtues 
which are perfections of the cognitive part of the soul but do not extend to action. But 
prudence is special: Since it concerns the application of right reason to action, which 
requires not just a true doxastic attitude about what to do but also a consequent 
goodness of appetite and action, it has an essential connection to good action. Therefore, 
it is a virtue in the strong sense of the word, even if it is an intellectual virtue.  
Secondly, Aquinas asks whether or not prudence is specifically different from the other 
virtues.
21
 On his view, habits and faculties are differentiated according to their 
respective objects. There are some objects which are formally distinct and therefore 
make for the “deep” differences between the different faculties of the soul. Other 
objects are only materially distinct and therefore make for the “shallower” differences 
between the different habits that belong to one and the same faculty of the soul. This 
principle yields the following scheme of virtues:  
 
[S]ince prudence is in reason, as we said, it is distinguished from the other intellectual virtues 
according to a material difference of the objects. For wisdom, science, and intellect concern 
necessary things; but art and prudence concern contingent things; but art concerns producible 
things that consist in external matter, like a house, a knife and things like that; but prudence 
concerns action, which exists in the agent himself, as we said above. But prudence is 
distinguished from the moral virtues according to the formal characteristics of the different 
faculties, namely the intellective faculty, in which prudence is, and the appetitive faculty, in 
which moral virtue is. Therefore it is clear that prudence is a special virtue that is distinct from 
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all other virtues.
22 
 
So on the one hand, prudence is different from the moral virtues, because it belongs to 
the cognitive rather than the appetitive faculty of the soul, the object of which are good 
things only materially speaking, i.e. as things of which something true or false can be 
predicated.
23
 On the other hand, prudence differs from the other intellectual virtues. 
While it shares their “veridic” setting, it has an object that is materially distinct from the 
respective objects of the other intellectual virtues. For wisdom (sapientia), science 
(scientia), and intellect (intellectus) concern necessary objects; but art (ars) and 
prudence (prudentia), because they are intellectual virtues of practical reason, concern 
contingent objects. Art and prudence, in turn, are different because art concerns 
production and prudence concerns moral action. 
 
(III) So in STh II-II, q. 47, Aquinas adopts the Aristotelian scheme of intellectual virtues 
in order to characterise prudence as a special virtue. This is odd, however, because it 
seems that this scheme is, from his point of view, incomplete. In order to support this 
claim, I would like to make three observations concerning Aquinas's general 
understanding of moral knowledge.
24
 
The first observation regards the continuation of q. 47 in article 6, where Aquinas argues 
that prudence does not appoint the moral virtues their ends.
25
 He assumes that there is a 
parallel structure to be found in theoretical and practical reason that resembles the 
Aristotelian distinction between intellect and science: In theoretical reason, there are 
naturally known principles with which intellect is concerned; and there are conclusions 
from these principles which are the subject of demonstration and with which science is 
concerned. In practical reason, accordingly, there are naturally known principles the 
object of which are the ends of the moral virtues; and there are conclusions from these 
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principles the object of which are the means to the respective ends. However, the 
intellectual virtue that is concerned with the principles of practical reason is 
synderesis
26
, which therefore appoints the moral virtues their end.
27
 Prudence, on the 
other hand, is the intellectual virtue that is concerned with certain conclusions from 
these principles, i.e. with finding the means to the ends set by synderesis. Therefore, 
Aquinas concludes that „synderesis moves prudence, just as the intellect of principles 
moves science“.28  
The second observation regards Aquinas's treatment of moral philosophy in the 
prologue to his commentary on the Nikomachean Ethics.
29
 In this text, he uses a 
different criterion to establish a distinction between theoretical and practical reason: 
Moral philosophy is distinct from natural philosophy not because the object of the first 
is contingent while the object of the latter is necessary. Rather, it is different because 
reason assumes a different role in moral philosophy. In natural philosophy, reason has 
the merely theoretical role of recognizing an order that is already out there in the world 
independent of reason's activity. In moral philosophy, on the other hand, reason has a 
practical role, because through its act of cognition, it is the source of a normative order 
for the acts of the faculty of human action, i.e. the will. Therefore, Aquinas points out 
that moral philosophy concerns only those actions which are in our power and can 
therefore be guided by practical reason.  
The third observation regards Aquinas's conception of natural law in which two central 
themes of his moral philosophy are joined together: that practical reason also has a 
scientific structure; and that practical reason is the faculty of normative judgement.
30
 
Accordingly, he defines natural law as the sum of the first principles of practical reason, 
which parallel the first indemonstrable principles of theoretical reason and which are 
known through a specific intellectual virtue, namely synderesis, which is the “habit that 
contains the precepts of natural law, which are the first principles of human actions”.31 
He then argues that the fundamental concept of practical reason is the concept of the 
good, which practical reason interprets in its constitutive fundamental principle as an 
essentially normative concept: The good is that which has do be done, while the bad, as 
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the good's contradictory opposite, is that which has to be avoided.
32
 He then completes 
the picture of the epistemic structure of practical reason by arguing that there are two 
types of conclusions that can be drawn from the principles of practical reason.
33
 There 
are conclusions that follow from the principles in the strict sense of scientific 
demonstration. And there are conclusions that follow from the principles only in the 
wider sense of a further determination of general rules with respect to the contingent 
circumstances of action; a mode of reasoning that he associates with prudence.
34
 
These observations suggest that Aquinas is committed to the view that there are three 
intellectual virtues involved in moral action: first, synderesis as the habit of the 
universal principles of practical reason; second, practical science as the habit of the 
demonstrable conclusions from these principles; and third, prudence as the habit of non-
scientific, contingent conclusions from these principles. This picture supports the idea 
that the “scientification” of moral knowledge leads to a loss of relevance of the concept 
of prudence: Aristotle seems to think that prudence is the single most important 
cognitive faculty involved in moral action. But Aquinas assigns prudence only the 
subordinate role of drawing certain contingent conclusions regarding the means to the 
ends expressed in the principles of practical reason. But this picture also shows that 
Aquinas's attempt at characterising prudence on the basis of the Aristotelian distinction 
of intellectual virtues fails to connect with his own general understanding of moral 
knowledge. The Aristotelian scheme is based on a distinction between necessary and 
contingent objects of knowledge, but that does not account for the difference between 
intellect, science, and wisdom on the one hand and synderesis, practical science, and 
prudence on the other. For on Aquinas's general account of moral knowledge, synderesis 
and practical science also concern necessary truths. The difference between these sets of 
virtues is rather that the latter are virtues not of theoretical, but of practical reason as the 
faculty of normative judgement about human action. But the Aristotelian scheme lacks 
the conceptual resources to draw this distinction, thus leaving Aquinas with a 
characterisation of prudence that appears, by his own lights, as rather unspecific.
35
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2. Francisco de Vitoria on Prudence, Practical Science, and the Nature of Practical 
Reasoning 
 
Aristotle's and Aquinas's rival accounts of moral knowledge can be interpreted as posing 
the problem Francisco de Vitoria's conception of prudence is intended to solve. Vitoria's 
most comprehensive treatment of prudence can be found in his commentary on 
Aquinas's treatment of prudence in STh II-II, q. 47. This text, like Vitoria's 
commentaries on the Summa in general, is not a detailed literal commentary in the 
traditional medieval sense,
36
 but more of a commentary per modum quaestionis in 
which the text of Aquinas serves as a starting point for discussing those issues Vitoria 
himself is interested in.
37
 Accordingly, as I would like to show in this section, he uses 
this commentary to develop a conception of prudence that differs considerably from 
Aquinas's. And in doing so, he aims at a conception of prudence that is more 
consequently integrated into a Thomist understanding of moral knowledge. I will argue 
for these claims in three steps: First, I will reconstruct how Vitoria links his account of 
prudence with a certain understanding of the nature of practical reasoning. Secondly, I 
will show how this leads him to an extended scheme of seven intellectual virtues that 
connects prudence to a Thomist conception of moral knowledge. Finally, I will argue 
that the result is an integrated account of prudence and moral knowledge that Aquinas 
lacks. 
 
(I) In the articles 1-3 of ComSTh II-II, q. 47, Vitoria largely follows Aquinas's 
                                                                                                                                               
e.g. Kluxen 1980, Westberg 1994, Rhonheimer 1994, Finnis 1998, Flannery 2001, Honnefelder 2004, 
and Lutz-Bachmann 2008.  
36
 See e.g. del Punta 1998. 
37
 For the customary division of Vitoria's oevre into two major groups, namely the commentaries on 
Aquinas and Peter Lombard on the one hand and the free-standing relectiones on the other, see e.g. 
Langella 2010, 24. – Contrary to the “classical” interpetation of the School of Salamanca and its 
“founder” Vitoria as representing a more or less orthodox “revival of Thomism” (see e.g. Skinner 
1978, Alves/Moreira 2013), many scholars have pointed to the independence and originality of 
Vitoria's thought, which shows not only in his relectiones but in his commentaries on the Summa 
Theologiae as well. Thus, John Doyle writes with respect to Vitoria's commentary on STh II-II, q. 64 
(De homicidio): “[I]t is commenting on the text of St. Thomas; but at the same time it raises and 
answers questions, many of them outside the purview of Aquinas.” See Doyle 1998, 25. This, I think, 
would also be an apt description of Vitoria's commentary on Sth II-II, q. 47. For further assessments 
along these linse of Vitoria's relation to Aquinas in general and his commentaries on the Summa in 
particular, see e.g. Horst 1995, 39; Brieskorn 2010, xxvii-xxxiii; Oliveira e Silva 2014, passim. – I 
believe that the conception of prudence that can be found in Vitoria's commentary on STh II-II, q. 47 
is also present in his relectiones. However, in what follows, I will only be able to give a few hints in 
this direction, since a detailed analysis of the respective relectiones is beyond the scope of this article. 
10 
argumentation with respect to the place of prudence in the human soul. But he already 
begins to shifts the perspective by focusing mainly on how his conception of prudence 
is related to a certain understanding of the nature of practical reasoning. Accordingly, in 
the first article, he sums up Aquinas's line of reasoning for the claim that prudence 
belongs to the cognitive rather than the appetitive faculty of the soul, and more 
specifically to the rational rather than the sensual part of cognition.
38
 However, he gives 
a different reason for the second part of this claim: Aquinas argues that prudence is 
engaged in an abstract comparison (collatio) of states of affairs of which only reason is 
capable.
39
 While Vitoria also believes that prudence involves a skill that requires reason, 
it is, according to him, a certain kind of discursive reasoning (discurrere) that consists in 
“making conclusions and syllogisms” (facere consequentias et syllogismos).   
In the second article, Vitoria also follows Aquinas's argumentation according to which 
prudence belongs exclusively to practical reason because the prudent agent is the one 
who can “deliberate well”.40 In addition, however, he looks further into the nature of 
practical reasoning by introducing an objection to this claim. According to this 
objection, the reference to the concept of deliberation does not prove that prudence 
belongs exclusively to practical reason. For deliberation or practical reasoning proceeds 
“by way of a prudential syllogism” (per syllogismum prudentiale) which often includes 
premises that are purely theoretical. Thus, in the syllogism 
 
(M1) All poor persons must be given alms 
(m1) This person is poor 
(C1) This person must be given alms 
 
the major premise (M1) may be a practical proposition, i.e. a normative statement that is 
meant to guide our actions. But the minor premise (m1) is a theoretical proposition, i.e. a 
purely descriptive statement, and it is needed if the conclusion (C1) is to follow.
41 
Vitoria replies to this objection by conceding both that practical reasoning takes the 
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form of practical syllogisms and that in these syllogisms, some of the premises are 
theoretical rather than practical propositions. But he argues that prudence can still be 
said to belong exclusively to practical reason:  
 
In the prudential judgement, neither the major nor the minor premise belong to prudence, but 
they are scrounged from other sciences. But it belongs to prudence to deliberate and form 
syllogisms about medical and other matters, and infer the prudential conclusion […]. This 
conclusion is practical: therefore, prudence belongs to practical reason.
42
  
 
So Vitoria argues that the premises of a practical syllogism originate not in prudence 
itself but in other sciences or disciplines, e.g. in medicine.
43
 Prudence only has the job 
of putting these premises together into a syllogism and draw the conclusion. But since 
the conclusion of these syllogisms, as opposed to the minor premise, is always practical, 
because it is informed by a practical proposition that figures as the major premise, 
prudence belongs exclusively to practical reason.  
Finally, in the third article, Vitoria adopts Aquinas's claim that the prudent agent must 
cognize not only universal principles of action but also the singular circumstances of 
action, because prudence is in the business of applying knowledge to singular actions. 
And this application requires not only a universal judgement but also a “judgement 
about singularities” (judicium de singularibus).44 He supports this point by giving the 
following argument:  
 
The universal judgement does not suffice for the application to action. Because the universal 
judgement is indifferent to many singularities: therefore, in order that a man turn towards one 
singular act, a universal judgement does not suffice, but a particular judgement is required. For 
if a man is sitting at the table in order to turn towards eating, this judgement does not suffice: 
one should eat or one should drink, for through this judgement, I do not turn more towards this 
food or cup than to that [food or cup]. Therefore, an exterior action cannot follow, unless 
through a particular judgement: therefore a singular judgement is required. For the members 
are moved by a command of the will, and yet, if the will is indifferent, it surely cannot move 
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 In article 4, he claims that the major premise in this particular example concerning the giving of alms 
originates in theology. 
44
 ComSTh II-II, q. 47, a. 3. 
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the members in a determinate way.
45
  
 
Here, Vitoria again relies on the practical syllogism as the model of practical reasoning: 
For him, the application of knowledge to action means that the knowledge in question is 
actually guiding a particular action according to some normative consideration. In other 
words, practical reasoning must be able to determine what an agent actually does (or 
should do) in a given situation. Now the will cannot move the members of the body in a 
determinate way (i.e. command this particular action instead of that one) unless it is 
itself determined with respect to a particular action through a process of deliberation. 
Therefore, practical deliberation must take the shape of a prudential syllogism in order 
to be actually connected to action, i.e. it must involve not only a universal judgement 
about what types of actions are to be done or avoided, but also a particular judgement 
about a singular action actually having the relevant properties; and it must put these 
together to draw the conclusion that this particular action must therefore be performed 
(e.g. giving alms to this person or eating this slice of bread). This implies, of course, 
that neither a particular judgement suffices for action, because it does not say anything 
about what one should do. So practical reasoning can be translated into action only if a 
universal judgement and a particular judgement are combined by prudence into a 
practical syllogism. 
 
(II) Given this conception of prudence based on a certain understanding of the nature of 
practical reasoning, Vitoria then turns to the idea that prudence is a virtue. Following 
Aquinas, he explicates this idea by asking two questions, the first of which is: Is 
prudence a virtue at all?
46
 In order to answer this question, he briefly recapitulates 
Aquinas's argumentation, but then shifts the perspective of the discussion and ends up 
with a different solution. As we saw, Aquinas is lead mainly by aretaic considerations, 
according to which a virtue is a habit that is essentially connected with good action. 
Vitoria, on the other hand, concentrates exclusively on the distinction between different 
                                                 
45
 ComSTh II-II, q. 47, a. 3: “[N]on sufficiat judicium universale ad applicandum ad operationem. Quia 
universale judicium est indifferens ad multa singularia: ergo ut homo applicetur ad unum actum 
singularem, non sufficit judicium universale, sed requiritur particulare. Nam si homo sit ad mensam ut 
applicatur ad comedendum, non sufficit hoc judicium: comedendum est, vel bibendum est, nam per 
illud non est magis mea applicata ad istum cibum vel calicem quam ad illum. Ergo non potest operatio 
exterior applicari nisi per judicium particulare: ergo requiritur judicium singulare. Nam membra ex 
imperio voluntatis moventur, et tamen, si voluntas est indifferens, certe non poterunt membra 
determinate moveri.” 
46
 ComSTh II-II, q. 47, a. 4.  
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ways in which the good can be the object of a faculty or a habit of the soul, namely 
either materially under the concept of being (sub ratione entis), i.e. insofar as something 
true or false can be predicated of it; or formally under the concept of good (sub ratione 
boni), i.e. insofar as it is something to be strived for.
47
 Accordingly, two types of habits 
can be distinguished: Some habits concern something good only materially, namely 
under the concept of being. This is the case with science, for instance, which is 
concerned with God or with universals insofar as they are forms of being of which 
something true or false can be predicated.
48
 Other habits, namely the moral virtues, 
concern something good as such, i.e. insofar as it is something to be strived for. For 
Vitoria, these distinctions allow to answer the question whether or not prudence is a 
virtue:  
 
Because prudence concerns something good, it is a virtue. But because it does not concern 
something good formally, that is insofar as it is good, but rather materially, that is not insofar as 
it is good, but insofar as it is a being, therefore it is not a virtue in the sense in which other 
moral virtues are. Therefore the solution is that prudence is a virtue. And if we compare it to 
the intellectual virtues, i.e. the sciences, it has more of the character of a virtue than these, 
because it has some orientation towards the good; but the others do not. But if we compare it to 
the moral virtues, the moral virtues have more of the character of a virtue than prudence.
49 
 
So while Aquinas claims that prudence is a virtue in the same strong sense in which the  
moral virtues are, Vitoria assigns prudence an intermediate position. According to him, 
prudence is a virtue because it concerns something good. But it does not concern 
something good formally speaking, i.e. as something to be strived for, and therefore it is 
not a virtue in the strong sense in which the moral virtues are. And yet, since it has some 
relation to the good after all, because it concerns something good materially insofar as it 
falls under the concept of being, it can be distinguished from the other intellectual 
virtues, because these, it seems, do not even have a material relation to the good.  
                                                 
47
 It seems that in this article, the concept of ens plays the same role as the concept of verum in the text 
of Aquinas: It is meant to work as a counterpart of the concept of bonum to distinguish the formal 
object of the cognitive part of the soul from the formal object of the appetitive part of the soul.  
48
 ComSTh II-II, q. 47, a. 4: “Et sic [scientia, A.S.] fertur circa bonum materialiter, id est non quia 
bonum est, sed quia est ens.” 
49
  ComSTh II-II, q. 47, a. 4: “[Q]uia prudentia fertur circa bonum, ideo est virtus. Sed quia non fertur circa 
bonum formaliter, id est quia bonum est, sed circa bonum materialiter, id est non quia bonum est, sed 
quia est ens, ideo non est ita virtus sicut aliae virtutes morales. Resolutio ergo est quod prudentia est 
virtus. Et si comparemus illam ad virtutes intellectuales, scilicet scientias, plus habet de ratione 
virtutis quam illae, quia habet aliquem ordinem ad bonum; aliae vero non. Sed si comparemus eam ad 
morales, plus habent virtutes morales de ratione virtutis quam prudentia.” 
14 
This suggestion, however, is based on an inconsistent scheme of virtues. On the one 
hand, Vitoria claims that intellectual virtues such as science treat their objects (God, 
universals, etc.) under the concept of being and therefore do concern something good, 
but only materially; that's what distinguishes all of them from the moral virtues the 
object of which is something good as such. On the other hand, he claims that prudence, 
as opposed to the other intellectual virtues, concerns something good, though it does so 
only materially. The problem apparently is that one and the same criterion (ens vs. 
bonum or a material vs. a formal relation towards the good) cannot be used both to 
distinguish intellectual virtues from moral virtues and to distinguish prudence from 
other intellectual virtues. Furthermore, by associating prudence with the concept of ens 
rather than the concept of bonum, Vitoria runs the risk of disconnecting prudence from 
action like the other intellectual virtues in the Aristotelian scheme.  
Therefore, in addressing the second question “How is prudence different from the other 
virtues?” in a. 5, Vitoria develops an alternative scheme of virtues that is meant to sort 
these issues out. First, he recapitulates the principle Aquinas draws on to distinguish 
prudence from the other virtues, namely the principle that faculties and habits of the 
soul are different if they have different objects; and that different faculties require 
formally different objects while different habits belonging to one and the same faculty 
only require materially different objects. But instead of explaining how Aquinas actually 
uses this principle to distinguish prudence from the other virtues (“Vide eas in 
littera.”50), he raises a doubt regarding the Aristotelian five-way distinction of 
intellectual virtues with which Aquinas is working:  
 
It seems that the Doctor does not determine the distinction between prudence and synderesis, 
which is the intellect with regard to the moral principles, and also not [the distinction of 
prudence] from moral science, which we study in the Ethics. How then is it distinguished from 
these?
51 
 
So Vitoria points to the problem identified in the last section of this paper, namely that 
Aquinas works with the Aristotelian scheme of five intellectual virtues which does not 
connect the concept of prudence to a Thomist understanding of moral knowledge. 
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 ComSTh II-II, q. 47, a. 5. 
51
 ComSTh II-II, q. 47, a. 5: “Videtur quod Doctor non ponit distinctionem inter prudentiam et 
synderesim, quae est intellectus circa principia moralia, nec a scientia morali quam studemus in 
Ethicis. Quomodo ergo distinguuntut ab istis?” 
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Vitoria therefore extends the scheme by assigning synderesis and moral science their 
respective places in a system of intellectual virtues that is based on a Thomist 
understanding of moral knowledge:  
 
I say that prudence is distinguished from synderesis because synderesis also concerns things to 
be done; but they are still different, because synderesis concerns necessary and self-evident 
propositions, for there are many necessary propositions in moral matters, and prudence 
concerns contingent propositions. Mostly prudence is distinguished from synderesis because 
synderesis concerns necessary principles, but prudence concerns contingent propositions; 
synderesis concerns self-evident propositions, prudence concerns opinions. But from moral 
science prudence is distinguished in the same way, because moral science concerns necessary 
propositions, though these are not in the same way necessary as the propositions of the 
mathematical science, but in the way in which the propositions of the physical science are, in 
which that is called necessary which happens in most cases.
52
 
 
Vitoria's first point in this passage is that synderesis, prudence, and moral science are all 
concerned with action; concerned, that is to say, with action from a specifically 
normative point of view – as actions to be performed.53 His Thomist understanding of 
natural law as the set of first principles of practical reason based on the normative 
concept of the good
54
 suggests to interpret this point as follows: These intellectual 
virtues, even though they are virtues of reason and not of the will, are concerned with 
the good formally speaking, namely not as something that is the case (i.e. as the object 
of descriptive judgements) but as that which should be done (i.e. as the object of 
normative judgements); that is to say, they are specifically virtues of practical reason. 
That is what sets them apart from the virtues of theoretical reason, i.e. intellect, science 
and wisdom, all of which may treat something good as their object, but only materially 
under the concept of being (or as the object of descriptive judgements).
55 
 
                                                 
52
 ComSTh II-II, q. 47, a. 5: “Dico quod distinguitur [prudentia, A.S.] a synderesi quia synderesis bene 
est circa agibilia; sed tamen differunt, quia illa est circa necessaria et per se nota, nam multa sunt 
necessaria in moralibus, et prudentia est circa contingentia. Ut in plurimum prudentia distinguitur a 
synderesi quia synderesis est de principiis necessariis, sed prudentia est de contingentibus; synderesis 
de per se notis, prudentia de opinativis. Sed a scientia morali eodem modo distinguitur prudentia; quia 
scientia moralis est de necessariis, licet non sint illa eo modo necessaria quo scientiae mathematicae, 
sed eo modo quo scientiae physicae, in quibus dicitur illud necessarium quod ut in plurimum 
contigit.“ 
53
 Hence Vitoria follows Aquinas later in article 8 by defending the view that prescribing (praecipere) is 
the principle act of prudence.  
54
 See ComSTh I-II, q. 94 and Spindler 2015, 161-196. 
55
 Thus, instead of treating ens and bonum as the respective objects that distinguish the cognitive and the 
appetitive parts of the soul, Vitoria, following Aquinas, treats them as the fundamental concepts of 
theoretical reason (ens) and practical reason (bonum). 
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Vitoria's second point in this passage is to propose a subdivision of these intellectual 
virtues of practical reason that is also inspired by a Thomist understanding of moral 
knowledge: While synderesis and moral science both have necessary
56
 propositions 
about human action as their object, where synderesis is, more specifically, the habit of 
the self-evident principles of practical reason, prudence has contingent propositions 
about human action as its object, namely certain conclusions from the principles in 
question. Consequently, he follows Aquinas in the next article by arguing that prudence 
is not concerned with the ends of the moral virtues but only with the means to those 
ends which, in turn, are set by synderesis as the habit of the principles of practical 
reason.
57
 
 
(III) As we saw in the previous section, Aquinas characterises prudence in STh II-II, q. 
47 on the basis of Aristotle's five-way distinction of intellectual virtues, though this 
scheme fails to connect the concept of prudence to his general understanding of the 
epistemic structure of moral knowledge. As it has now turned out, Vitoria successfully 
extends the scheme of intellectual virtues to fit this more complex Thomist 
understanding of moral knowledge. This modified scheme includes not five but seven 
intellectual virtues, and it is based on a Thomist understanding of the distinction 
between theoretical and practical reason: There are intellectual virtues of practical 
reason (synderesis, practical science, prudence, and art) and intellectual virtues of 
theoretical reason (intellect, science, and wisdom). The former concern normative 
judgements about action under the concept of good (bonum), while the latter concern 
descriptive judgements about the world
58
 under the concept of being (ens). The 
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 Fidora 2013, 75 argues that one way of reintegrating prudence into moral philosophy would be to call 
into question the scientific standards which moral philosophy, according to authors like Aquinas, 
should meet. Now it seems that Vitoria takes up this suggestion in the text at hand, because he writes 
that what is necessary in moral philosophy is necessary only in a weaker sense of the word. However, 
in his theory of natural law as the set of necessary principles of practical reason, which appears to 
correspond quite well with his distinction of synderesis, moral science, and prudence, he insists that 
there are indeed necessary truths about human action that cannot be otherwise; see e.g. STh I-II, q. 94 
and STh I-II, q. 100, a. 8. Therefore, I will treat Vitoria as saying that the truths with which synderesis 
and moral science are concerned are necessary in the strict sense of the word.  
57
 ComSTh II-II, q. 47, a. 6. In some passages, Vitoria seems to suggest that prudence, too, is concerned 
with principles; see e.g. ComSTh II-II, q. 47, a. 3: “Sed alia sunt principia non per se nota, et de his est 
prudentia.” But given his rather firm assertions that prudence is not concerned with the premises of 
practical reasoning but rather with drawing the conclusions, and that prudence is not concerned with 
the ends of human actions but rather with the means to these ends, I will treat him as saying that the 
difference between synderesis and prudence is that the first is a habit of principles while prudence is a 
habit of conclusions.  
58
 By „world“ I mean the totality of things that might be the object of descriptive judgements, and I take 
this to include human action as well. Vitoria does not say that explicitly, but it would seem that the 
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intellectual virtues of practical reason, in turn, can be distinguished as follows: 
Synderesis, practical science, and prudence are virtues of action in the narrow sense of 
moral praxis, while art is the virtue of production. And while synderesis and practical 
science both concern necessary propositions with regard to moral action, prudence 
concerns certain contingent conclusions from these propositions. 
This account of prudence on the basis of a modified scheme of intellectual virtues again 
confirms the hypothesis that prudence suffers a loss of relevance in the wake of the 
“scientification” of moral knowledge:59 For Vitoria (as for Aquinas), prudence is not the 
single most important intellectual virtue of moral action (as it is for Aristotle). Instead, it 
is a subordinate habit that is concerned with the application of moral principles to action 
and that acts in service of the “scientific” habits of synderesis and moral science. On the 
other hand, however, the claim that Vitoria excludes prudence from moral knowledge 
does not appear to be convincing. Instead, Vitoria (as opposed to Aquinas) includes 
prudence into a comprehensive scheme of intellectual virtues that is consistent with a 
Thomist understanding of moral knowledge. This extended scheme has two mayor 
advantages over the original Aristotelian one: Firstly, it does not rely on a distinction 
between intellectual virtues and moral virtues based on a distinction between the 
concepts of being (ens) and good (bonum) as the respective formal objects of the 
cognitive and the appetitive part of the soul – a distinction that results in the blurring of 
the distinction between the intellectual virtues of practical reason and the intellectual 
virtues of theoretical reason. Instead, Vitoria follows Aquinas in assuming that we relate 
both cognitively and appetitively to the good as such, even though practical reason 
views it normatively as something to be strived for while the will views it as an actual 
object of striving. Secondly, this scheme allows Vitoria to explain how practical reason, 
because of the close connection of synderesis, practical science, and prudence, can 
actually be practical: Without synderesis, prudence could not be practical, because its 
judgement would lack the normative force it derives from synderesis as the habit of the 
universal principles of practical reason. At the same time, synderesis and practical 
science could not be practical without prudence, for even though their judgment is 
                                                                                                                                               
distinction between theoretical and practical reason based on the formal concepts of ens and bonum 
allows for human action to be the object both of descriptive and normative considerations. Theory of 
action, as Vitoria understands it (e.g. in his Relectio de eo, ad quod tenetur homo, cum primum venit 
ad usum rationis), is descriptive in the sense that it is not concerned with how one should act but 
rather with the „nature“ of intentional action. It is meant to show precisely how intentional action, as 
opposed to other events in nature, can be the object of normative judgement because of its peculiar 
nature. See Spinder 2015, 132-160. 
59
 See Fidora 2013. 
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normative, it still has to be applied to singular actions by way of a prudential syllogism 
in order to actually guide what we do.  
 
3. Prudence and the Problem of Contingency in Action  
 
Vitoria's suggestion, however, is also problematic. It seems that he demands two things 
of prudence: On the one hand, prudence is meant to allow an agent to deal cognitively 
with the problem of contingency in moral action. On the other hand, it is meant to guide 
what an agent actually does by applying universal moral principles to particular actions. 
But as I would like to show in this section, Vitoria's answer to the second demand 
makes it impossible for him to give a convincing answer to the first. In order to do so, I 
will begin by recalling a few themes from Donald Davidson's work on the nature of 
practical reasoning. Secondly, I will show how these help to identify two major 
difficulties in Vitoria's idea of how prudence allows us to deal with the problem of 
contingency in action. Finally, I will argue that the first of these difficulties may be 
removable from Vitoria's conception of prudence, but the second is not.  
 
(I) Turning to Davidson in this context suggests itself for two reasons: For one thing, he 
deals explicitly with the practical syllogism as a model for practical reasoning. And for 
another, he employs a conception of “moral conflict” that provides a plausible basis for 
spelling out what it could mean to say that prudence allows an agent to deal with the 
problem of contingency in action. He does all this in his discussion of weakness of the 
will, in which he aims to explain how someone can judge that it would be better, all 
things considered, to do x than to do y, and yet do y.
60
 The point I would like to make 
does not depend on the details of Davidson's solution to this problem, but rather on the 
way in which he sets it up.  
For Davidson, weak-willed or “incontinent” actions are intentional actions. So when an 
agent performs an incontinent action y, he acts for a reason. But the weak-willed agent 
also has a reason for doing x; after all, he judges that, all things considered, it would be 
better to do x than to do y. Thus, a weak-willed agent acts “in the face of competing 
claims”61, because he has independent reasons for action that point in different 
directions. That is why Davidson suggests to treat weakness of the will as a special case 
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 Davidson 2001, 21-42. 
61
 Davidson 2001, 34. 
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of “moral conflict” understood in a rather broad sense of the term:  
 
By a case of moral conflict I mean a case where there are good reasons both for performing an 
action and for performing one that rules it out (perhaps refraining from the action). There is 
conflict in this minimal sense whenever the agent is aware of considerations that, taken alone, 
would lead to mutually incompatible actions […].62  
 
So on Davidson's account, a moral conflict is a situation in which a person has a reason 
for an action and at the same time another, independent reason for another action the 
performance of which is incompatible with the performance of the first.
63
  
Against this background, Davidson's negative claim is that the classical solutions to the 
problem of weakness of the will proposed by Aristotle and Aquinas are not convincing. 
For both authors presuppose a model of the structure of practical reasoning that is 
unable to account for a moral conflict in this sense. According to Davidson, Aristotle 
and Aquinas assume that practical reasoning consists in forming practical syllogisms. 
Based on this model of practical reasoning, the state of mind of an agent in a situation 
of moral conflict may be illustrated as follows:
64
  
 
The Side of Reason    The Side of Lust 
 
(M2) No fornication is lawful    (M3) Pleasure is to be pursued 
(m2) This is an act of fornication    (m3) This act is pleasant 
(C2) This act is not lawful    (C3) This act is to be pursued 
 
This illustration shows how one might think of the state of mind of an agent who is 
confronted with independent considerations that support two incompatible actions: 
Seeing the action as a case of fornication leads to the conclusion that one should not do 
it, while seeing the very same action as one that will result in pleasure leads to the 
conclusion that one should do it. But the obvious problem is that (C2) and (C3) are, as 
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 Davidson 2001, 33f. 
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 Despite calling conflicts of this kind „moral“, Davidson insists that the problem of conflicting reasons 
does not depend on the nature (moral or otherwise) of the reasons involved (see ibid.: 30). Also, even 
though he describes moral conflict as a situation in which „there are good reasons“ for two 
incompatible actions, his point is not that these be objectively good reasons; it will suffice that the 
reasons are potential reasons for action from the point of view of the agent (for Davidson's 
„internalist“ view of the relation between explanation and justification of actions through reference to 
reasons, see e.g. Davidson 2001, 83f.). 
64
 This is the example Davidson gives following Aquinas's extension of the Aristotelian model of the 
practical syllogism. See Davidson 2001, 33. 
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Davidson puts it, „in flat contradiction“.65 The two syllogisms, both of which are based 
on reasons that the agent actually has, yield conclusions that directly contradict one 
another, thus leaving the agent in the dark about what to do.  
According to Davidson, there are two features of this model of practical reasoning that 
cause the problem: Firstly, the mayor premise of a practical syllogism is thought of as a 
x(P(x)→Q(x)). So for all actions: If an action is 
an act of fornication, then it should not be performed; and if an action results in 
pleasure, then it should be performed. That is why the respective conclusions (C2) and 
(C3) follow from the premises in the first place by subsuming the action in question 
under a universal rule ((M2) or (M3)). Secondly, these practical syllogisms yield 
conclusions that can be disconnected from the principles expressed in the major 
premise: (C2) and (C3) say that the action in question should (or should not) be 
performed, period. As a consequence, this model of practical reasoning depicts a person 
in a situation of moral conflict as reasoning to inconsistent conclusions on the basis of 
her various reasons for action. And since these conclusions are being disconnected from 
the premises from which they follow, it leaves no clue as to how the person may then 
enter into “the all-important process of weighing considerations“66, a process through 
which she might decide on the basis of all relevant reasons what to do.  
 
(II) These themes from Davidson's work on the nature of practical reasoning help to 
identify two major difficulties Vitoria's conception of prudence is faces with. They both 
revolve around the first demand on prudence, namely that it allows an agent to deal with 
the problem of contingency in action; and they result from Vitoria's answer to the 
second demand, namely that prudence guides our actions by subsuming them under 
universal moral principles.  
Given Vitoria's account of prudence and practical reasoning, in what sense is there a 
problem with contingency in action? And how does prudence help the agent to 
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 Ibid. It is not evident that the sentences „This act is not lawful“ and „This act is to be pursued“ are 
actually contradicting each other, but Davidson's idea is that each of these syllogisms can be rephrased 
so that one yields the conclusion „It is better not to perform the action than to perform it“ („the side of 
reason“), while the other yields the conclusion „It is better to perform the action than not to perform 
it“ („the side of lust“); and these conclusions are clearly inconsistent. Furthermore, Davidson insists 
that the problem he discusses is not addressed by a theory of reasons according to which moral 
considerations override non-moral considerations; an idea that may suggest itself given the nature of 
the present example. There may be types of reasons that, in principle, override other types of reasons, 
but then the relation between these types of reasons is not a case of moral conflict (see again Davidson 
2001, 30). 
66
 Davidson 2001, 36. 
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overcome that problem? In order to answer these questions, it is instructive to return to 
ComSTh II-II, q. 47, a. 4 once more, where Vitoria confronts his claim that prudence is 
a virtue with an objection. This objection reminds us that, according to Aristotle, 
opinion (opinio) is not an intellectual virtue, because it can be either true or false.
67
 It 
then suggests that prudence is nothing but a kind of opinion, because its judgement 
often concerns matters about which there is no certainty (thus reading Aristotle as 
making a point not so much about the truth value but rather about the justification of 
opinion):  
 
Prudence deals with the judgement about contracts, whether they are licit or illicit, and about 
that, there is no certainty, so prudence does not proceed with certainty. It is certain that one 
must not kill. However, if this man wants to take away my coat, it is not certain whether it is 
allowed to kill him or not, but it is a matter of opinion; and yet opinion is not a virtue: therefore 
neither is prudence.
68
  
 
This objection is based on two premisses. The first is Vitoria's own model of practical 
reasoning: Practical reasoning starts from a universal premise that is known with 
certainty. Prudence then draws a conclusion from this premise by subsuming a 
particular action under the principle in question, i.e. it arrives at a judgement that a 
particular action, given a certain universal normative principle and a corresponding 
description of the action, ought (not) to be performed or is (not) allowed. The second 
premise is that an opinion is a judgement that p based on strong reasons in favor of p 
(“habeo magnam apparentiam quod est licitus”) and yet passed in the face of some 
contrary evidence (“tamen habeo formidinem/scrupulum in contrarium”); if all contrary 
evidence were absent, it would not be opinion but science (scientia) or faith (fides).
69
 
The argumentation then runs as follows: Whether or not a particular action is allowed, 
forbidden, or obligatory is often uncertain, despite the fact that the universal premise of 
the practical syllogism is not: Even though it is certain that it is forbidden to kill another 
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 “[A]liquando est verum vel falsum”. ComSTh II-II, q. 47, a. 4. See Aristotle, Nikomachean Ethics, 
1139b15-18. 
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 ComSTh II-II, q. 47, a. 4: “[P]rudentia versatur circa judicium de contractibus, an sunt liciti vel illiciti, 
et de hoc non habetur evidentia, nam prudentia non procedit per evidentiam. Evidens est quod non est 
occidendum. Tamen si iste vult accipere a me pallium, non est evidens an sit licitum occidere illum 
necne, sed est sub opinione; et tamen opinio non est virtues: ergo nec prudentia.” – In this passage, I 
have decided to translate evidentia as “certainty”. For “evidence” would have suggested that the point 
in this passage was that the judgement of prudence is not based on evidence. But the point is not that 
the judgement of prudence is not grounded in evidence or reasons, but rather that the judgement of 
prudence, given its specific subject matter, is not as certain as the judgement of, say, science.   
69
 Ibid. 
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person, it is still a matter of opinion whether or not it is licit to kill this person who tries 
to steal one's coat. Given the account of epistemic uncertainty that objection relies on, 
this means that there are reasons that count in favor of the action being allowed and also 
reasons that count in favor of the action being forbidden. Now it is the job of prudence 
to guide our action by arriving at a definite judgement that under these circumstances, it 
actually is (or is not) allowed to kill that person, and it must do so on the basis of 
evidence that points in different directions. Therefore, it is a kind of opinion. But since 
opinion is not a virtue, neither is prudence.  
Vitoria replies to this objection that prudence is not a kind of opinion because it has a 
special role in practical reasoning:  
 
[O]ne can say that the final conclusion and the final judgement in the practical syllogism is 
prudential, and neither the major nor the minor premise belongs to prudence; e.g. ʻevery poor 
man must be given almsʼ, this major belongs to theology; but the minor, namely ʻthis man is 
poorʼ, is not and does not proceed from prudence, because I do not know whether it is 
necessary. The conclusion then is: ʻtherefore he must be given almsʼ. Thus I say that this 
conclusion is prudence, and it is not opinion, because the conclusion is certain, because the 
alms must be given. And so we can say that prudence for the most part is not opinion, because 
it is certain, even though it presupposes opinion.
70 
 
So Vitoria attempts to meet the objection by applying the model of practical reasoning 
that he developed in the previous articles: Practical reasoning takes the shape of a 
practical syllogism with a universal major premise and a particular minor premise, both 
of which originate from habits other than prudence. The role of prudence then is to draw 
the conclusion from these premises. But since the conclusion follows necessarily from 
the premises even if the minor premise is only an opinion, the judgement of prudence is 
certain. Therefore, it is not a kind of opinion, and an intellectual virtue after all.
71
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 ComSTh II-II, q. 47, a. 4: “Secundo, potest dici quod conclusio ultima et judicium ultimum in 
syllogismuo practico est prudentiale, et major nec minor non pertinent ad prudentiam; ut cuilibet 
pauperi danda est eleemosyna, haec major pertinet ad theologiam; sed minor, scilicet iste est pauper, 
non est nec procedit a prudentia, quia nescio an habeat necessitatem. Tunc est conclusio: ergo huic est 
danda eleemosyna. Tunc dico quod haec conclusio est prudentia, et non est opinio, quia certum est 
consequens, quia danda est eleemosyna. Et sic possumus dicere quod prudentia pro major parte non 
est opinio, quia est certa, licet praesuponat opinionem.”  
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 I argued above (footnote 56) that I shall not pursue Vitoria's hint that the object of practical science 
may not be necessary in the strict sense in which the objects of the theoretical sciences are. The reason 
I gave was that this claim appears to contradict the doctrine of natural law that he develops in other 
texts. Now yet another reason for not pursuing this line of reasoning has revealed itself: Vitoria wants 
to say that the conclusion of a practical syllogism follows necessarily from its premises, and that 
therefore prudence is a habit of certainty and not a habit of opinion. So if he were to adopt the view 
23 
So it seems that for Vitoria, the problem of contingency in action amounts to the 
problem that even if it is certain in principle what one should do, the circumstances of 
action often vary and may combine in ways that make it difficult to judge which action 
ought (not) to be performed in a particular situation. This judgement is difficult because 
the evidence on the basis of which it must be passed points in different directions: There 
are reasons in favor of a certain course of action, but there are also reasons that count 
against it. Thus, the problem of contingency in action is the problem of deciding what to 
do in a situation of moral conflict in the Davidsonian sense. 
Now since prudence is meant to help an agent to overcome this problem, it would seem 
that there must be some place in the kind of discursive reasoning with which prudence 
is concerned where this problem of contingency in action is being addressed. As far as 
the conclusion is concerned, however, Vitoria very clearly says that this is not the place 
where the problem of contingency is being addresses. If the conclusion of a practical 
syllogism follows from the premises at all, it follows necessarily, even if some of the 
premises are not known with certainty. Hence his claim that prudence is not a kind of 
opinion, even though it sometimes presupposes opinion.  
With respect to the major premise, Vitoria believes that it is a judgement that has the 
form of a universalized conditional. Accordingly, in his Relectio de homicidio, in order 
to show that there are indeed exceptions to the prohibition of homicide, he interprets the 
commandment “Thou shalt not kill!” as a shorthand for a universal rule that is a bit 
more specific and contains two exceptions: It is always forbidden to kill another person, 
except when it is an act of self-defense or when it is the official punishment of a 
criminal who threatens the republic.
72
 So whether or not I am allowed to kill the person 
who tries to steal my coat will depend, for example, on whether or not this action can 
plausibly be described as an act of self-defense. Maybe the person is my fellow polar 
explorer, and if she takes away my coat, I will freeze to death. But then the problem of 
contingency in action is not being addressed at the level of the major premise either. For 
in this case, there are no independent considerations that lend support to incompatible 
courses of action and that require the agent to act “in the face of competing claims”. 
Rather, there is one universal principle that already contains the full range of the 
                                                                                                                                               
that the mayor premise of a practical syllogism is not a universalized conditional (i.e. necessary in the 
strict sense) but only a rough generalization (e.g. „fornication is mostly wrong“), he would have to 
adress the problem that the conclusion would not follow from the premises anymore. 
72
 This seems to be the result of the argumentation in the second part of the Relectio de homicidio; see 
Francisco de Vitoria 1995 and Doyle 1997.  
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conditions of its consistent application.  
This leaves the minor premise of the practical syllogism. And Vitoria indeed argues that 
it may be the object of opinion, i.e. it may be a judgement that we pass in the face of 
conflicting reasons or evidence pointing in different directions and therefore without 
certainty. So I might judge – without certainty, i.e. based on strong supporting evidence 
and in the face of some contrary evidence – that this particular action probably is an act 
of self-defense.
73
 Examples of this kind of reasoning abound in Vitoria's writings, for 
instance in his Relectio de Indis, in which he often addresses an issue not at the 
conceptual level of principles but rather at the empirical level of singular cases and how 
they have to be described to figure in minor premises of the argumentation. So for 
instance, when rebutting the claim that the indigenous people of America were 
rightfully subjected by the Spanish because they were lacking reason and therefore a 
proper legal status, he does not question the major premise of the argument. Thus, he 
does not question the principle that only creatures endowed with reason have a legal 
status, but explicitly affirms it: “Irrational creatures cannot have dominion.”74 Instead, 
he rebuts the argument by showing that its minor premise is false: The indigenous 
people do posses reason, and this is evidenced by their complex social, cultural, and 
political life: “They have a certain order in their affairs, for they have orderly arranged 
political communities, they have distinct marriages, magistrates, masters, laws, tasks, 
exchanges, which all require the use of reason; also a kind of religion. Also, they don't 
err in things that are evident for others, which is an indication of the use of reason.”.75 
But while this evidence supports the claim that the indigenous people possess reason, 
Vitoria admits that there is also some contrary evidence – “that they seem so 
unreasonable and mindless” because of their poor education.76 But this contrary 
evidence does not outweigh the evidence in favor of the claim that they are rational 
creatures, for it only says something about their culture and nothing about their nature.  
                                                 
73
 So the „moral conflict“ in this case consists in conflicting reasons for a purely theoretical judgement 
(namely the judgement that a given action falls under a certain description) and not conflicting reasons 
for a practical judgement. But it seems that Davidson's broad concept of moral conflict, at the heart of 
which is the idea of conflicting reasons for judgement, can be extended to include the case of 
theoretical judgement just as well. 
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 Francisco de Vitoria 1997, 389. I would like to thank the anonymous reviewer of the Archiv für 
Geschichte der Philosophie for making me aware of the relevance of De Indis for Vitoria's conception 
of prudence. 
75
  “[H]abent ordinem aliquem in suis rebus, postquam habent civitates, quae ordine constant, et    habent 
matrimonia distincta, magistratus, dominos, leges, opificia, commutationes, quae omnia requirunt 
usum rationis, item religionis speciem. Item non errant in rebus, quae aliis sunt evidentes, quod est 
indicium usus rationis.“ Francisco de Vitoria 1997, 402.  
76
 “quod videantur tam insensati et hebetes”. Francisco de Vitoria 1997, 402 (my emphasis). 
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So to sum up, Vitoria and Davidson use quite different strategies to avoid conflicting 
conclusions from the premises of practical reasoning. On Davidson's reading of the 
Aristotelian-Thomist account of practical reasoning, a situation of moral conflict would 
look like this:  
 
(M4) It is forbidden to kill a human being  (M5) It is allowed to kill someone in self-defense  
(m4) This is an act of killing a human being  (m5) This is an act of killing someone in self-defense 
(C4) This act is forbidden    (C5) This act is allowed 
 
In order to avoid the conflicting conclusions (C4) and (C5,) Davidson proposes to give 
up the idea that the starting points of practical reasoning are universalized conditionals 
of the form x(P(x)→Q(x)). Instead, he argues, we should think of them as prima facie-
judgements that lend conditional support to actions insofar as they have certain 
properties.
77
 Vitoria, on the other hand, avoids the inconsistent conclusions (C4) and 
(C5) by merging (M4) and (M5) into one universal principle that contains the full range 
of conditions of its consistent application and then making the conclusion depend fully 
on what sort of minor premise the agent is able to establish on the basis of the evidence 
available to her. This idea may be illustrated as follows:  
 
(M6) It is always forbidden to kill a person, except in self-defense or in capital punishment 
(m6) Killing the person who tries to steal my coat is an act of self-defense 
(C6) It is allowed to kill that person  
 
In this model of practical reasoning, establishing the minor premise of a practical 
syllogism by weighing evidence that points in different directions is about determining 
whether or not (and in which sense) the action at hand is a case of a certain universal 
principle of action. If it is not, then the conclusion does not follow anyway; and if it is, 
it follows necessarily, even if an opinion figures as the minor premise. There are, 
however, two major difficulties with this suggestion. The first difficulty concerns the 
minor premise of the practical syllogism: How does the agent get from “probably p” 
(“This is probably an act of self-defense.”), which is all the evidence available to her 
warrants, to “p” (“This is an act of self-defense.”), which is the form in which the minor 
premise must figure in the syllogism to allow the agent to draw the conclusion? The 
second difficulty concerns the restriction of the problem of contingency to the 
                                                 
77
 Davidson 2001, 37ff. 
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establishment of the minor premise of a practical syllogism: Is this really the most 
convincing interpretation of the problem of contingency in moral action that motivates 
the discourse about prudence in the first place?  
 
(III) I would like to suggest that there may be a way out of the first difficulty that is not 
only compatible with Vitoria's conception of practical reasoning but relies on one of its 
important insights. The second difficulty, however, cannot be resolved on the basis of 
the model of practical reasoning Vitoria proposes. 
I will begin with the first difficulty: The model of the practical syllogism has often been 
criticised from an Aristotelian point of view for being overly idealistic and for imposing 
formal requirements on our practical reasoning that are just not attainable by real agents 
acting in the real world with all its fuzziness and ambiguity.
78
 However, it seems that 
Vitoria's point is not to deny that the circumstances in which we have to act are often 
fuzzy and ambiguous, but rather to make us aware of the fact that even under such 
circumstances, we are eventually going to have to do something. In other words, what 
primarily motivates his recourse to the model of the practical syllogism and its tight 
integration of moral judgement and intentional action is the idea that there is a certain 
requirement for disambiguation in intentional action.
79
 Take Vitoria's example of the 
duty to give alms to the poor again: Given all available evidence, I may not be certain 
whether or not the person before me is poor. Some of the evidence suggests that he 
probably is poor, while some evidence suggests that he may not be poor after all. Now 
in a purely theoretical context, I may chose to suspend my judgement on that matter; or 
I may chose to content myself with believing that he is probably poor, though he may 
after all not be. These forms of modesty, however, are not available to me if the doxastic 
attitude in question is one that I will have to act on in a given situation. It is not in the 
same way possible to choose to suspend intentional action in a given situation, because 
choosing to suspend intentional action effectively means intentionally refraining from 
doing something (while suspending the judgement on whether or not p in a purely 
theoretical context is not the same as judgeing that not p). As a consequence, it is also 
impossible to to suspend judgement on whether or not p or to make do with “probably 
p” if this judgement is to figure as the minor premise in my prudential syllogism. I am 
forced to disambiguate my doxastic attitude towards p (the poverty of the person before 
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 See e.g. Nussbaum 1978.  
79
 See e.g. ComSTh II-II, q. 47, a. 3 quoted above. 
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me), even if the evidence available to me is insufficient for that. If I give alms to this 
person because of a moral obligation to give alms to the poor, I have to assume that she 
is actually poor (so “p”); otherwise, my practical reasoning would not be conclusive. If, 
on the other hand, I choose not to give alms to this person because I am not certain 
whether or not she is poor, I effectively act as if I was sure that she is not poor, because 
I am assuming that this case is not a case of the moral principle in question (so “not p”); 
otherwise, I would have to give her alms. So Vitoria's model can be read as providing an 
answer to the question of how practical reasoning can actually result in an intentional 
action, even though part of the evidence it is based on is fuzzy and ambiguous. 
Accordingly, the transition from “probably p” to “p” in the minor premise is rationally 
required due to a requirement for disambiguation in intentional action.
80
  
With respect to the second difficulty, however, I believe there is no solution available 
that leaves Vitoria's framework intact. As we saw, Vitoria effectively isolates the kind 
practical reasoning with which prudence is concerned from the problem of contingency 
in action in order to allow prudence to actually guide our action. An important part of 
this strategy is the assumption that the universal principle or “law” that figures as the 
major premise of a prudential syllogism may include certain caveats to avoid moral 
conflict at the level of principles. Accordingly, he interprets the commandment “Though 
shalt not kill!” as always prohibiting the killing of another person, unless it is a case of 
self-defense or of justified capital punishment. What one has to do on the basis of this 
principle in any one situation will then depend on how this situation is being described 
in the minor premise. But even if one believes – as Vitoria apparently does – that 
principles like this one can be consistently formulated and integrated into a coherent 
system of “natural laws”, this model still leads us astray in an important respect: 
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 These considerations are inspired by Davidson's work on practical reasoning which revolves mainly 
around the question of how practical reasoning on the basis of conditional prima facie-judgements can 
lead to intentional action. The answer for Davidson is the „principle of continence“ which requires a 
rational agent to move from his conditional prima facie-judgements to an unconditional judgement 
that drives his action (see Davidson 2001, 41).  
 Thomas Höwing, in his invaluable commentaries on this text, has suggested to me that these 
considerations may link Vitoria's treatment of prudence with the relatively recent debate on 
„pragmatic encroachment“ in epistemology (see e.g. Fantl/McGrath 2007), according to which 
doxastic attitudes may, under certain circumstances, be justified not on the basis of the available 
evidence but on the basis of certain pragmatic or „practical“ considerations. However, I have come to 
believe that while there may be such a link somewhere (see e.g. Schüßler's (2003) work on medieaval 
and early modern approaches to decision-making under uncertainty), what I have suggested here is a 
different idea: The transision from „prabably p“ to „p“ in Vitoria is not justified by certain pragmatic 
considerations (i.e. the comparative merits and probabilities of certain options in a given situation of 
choice in conditions of uncertainty), but rather a principle requirement of disabiguation in intentional 
action. Thus, as with Davidson's „principle of continence“, it is not a point about rational choice but 
about the nature of intentional action.  
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“Complex” principles such as this one merge various normative judgements that are 
based on very different, and probably independent moral considerations into one 
universal rule of action. As a consequence, it is suggested that in a situation which 
requires the judgement of prudence, only one of these considerations is relevant – it is 
either a case of legitimate self-defense, or of justified capital punishment, or of murder. 
But the problem with the justification of killing in self-defense, for instance, seems to 
be that it appears to require the weighing of competing and independent reasons which 
retain their rational force even if we conclude that the principle of self-defense in certain 
case overrides the prohibition of killing; after all, I am still killing another human being, 
and isn't that still a normative problem even in those cases? Davidson rightly remarks 
that “feelings of strife and anxiety”81 are not essential to situations of moral conflict. 
But the fact that these feelings do occur from time to time when we face moral conflicts 
shows that even if we finally make up our minds to act on one consideration rather than 
another, the latter does not forfeit its rational force. Thus, the “moral conflict” that 
Vitoria allows for in the establishment of the minor premise of the practical syllogism 
appears to be only a shadow of the actual moral conflict that we face in situations like 
these. And it would seem that our interest in the concept of prudence originates in the 
hope that it can tell us something about how to deal rationally with such cases of moral 
conflict. But there is no conceptual space for this idea in Vitoria's conception of 
prudence and practical reasoning.  
 
5. Conclusion 
 
An examination of Vitoria's account of prudence shows once more that the 
„scientification“ of moral knowledge in the Middle Ages and early modernity calls into 
question the role of prudence in moral action.
 
In Vitoria, however, the problem is not 
that prudence is excluded from scientific moral knowledge but rather that it is included 
into a body of scientific moral knowledge by way of a conception of practical reasoning 
that is modeled on the scientific procedure of demonstration.
82
 This leads him to an 
integrated account of prudence and moral knowledge that Aquinas lacks but which is 
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 Ironically, the idea that practical reasoning takes the shape of practical syllogisms can also be traced 
back to Aristotle. Therefore, interpreters have tried to square the textual evidence concerning the 
practical syllogism (e.g. 1147a1-1147b18) with Aristotle's non-scientific understanding of moral 
knowledge. See e.g. Nussbaum 1978 or Aubenque 2007, 107-146. 
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unable to explain how prudence allows an agent to deal with the problem of 
contingency in action.
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